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FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT
HAmy H. WELINGTON t
Among the many competing goals of national labor policy, two
have been frequently proclaimed and staunchly defended, almost but
never quite to the death, by the Supreme Court of the United States.
One is industrial peace; the other is freedom of contract 2 -collective
contract, to be sure.' Both goals indeed are embedded deeply in the
myth and in the reality of national labor policy.
4
t Professor of Law, Yale University. A.B. 1947, University of Pennsylvania;
LL.B. 1952, Harvard University. This Article is a revised version of an address
delivered on November 1, 1963, at the Southwestern Legal Foundation's Tenth Annual
Institute on Labor Law.
1 See, e.g., Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) ; Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
2 See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) ; NLRB v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
8 Once a union is designated by a majority of employees in an appropriate unit
as collective bargaining representative, the employer must bargain with the union
over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, notwithstanding
the existence of individual contracts of hire. 3. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332
(1944).
Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify their
execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the
procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act looking to col-
lective bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee from a duly
ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they be used to'forestall bargaining or
to limit or condition the terms of the collective agreement. . . . [W]herever
private contracts conflict with its functions, they obviously must yield or the
Act would be reduced to a futility.
Id. at 337. "4 E.g., "The theory of the Act is that free 'opportunity for negotiation with
accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may
bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt
to compel." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
"The goal of federal labor policy, as expressed in the Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Acts, is the promotion of collective bargaining; to encourage the employer and the
representative of the employees to establish, through collective negotiation, their own
charter for the ordering of industrial relations, and thereby to minimize industrial
strife." Local 24, Int'l .Bhd. of.:Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959).
(467)
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It is hardly surprising that industrial peace is a proclaimed labor
policy goal. But it may seem surprising to some that freedom of
contract shares this distinction. No one thinks of the collective bar-
gaining agreement as the perfect example of a free contract. In labor
relations there is no freedom of choice, for example, with respect to
one's contracting partner.5 Nor are the parties free to contract in any
way they wish about union security; 6 and about hot cargo, they often
may not contract at all.7 Of course, the examples can be multiplied.'
Freedom of contract is nevertheless a relevant concept for under-
standing the collective bargaining agreement, since the parties should
be free to write their own terms and conditions of employment.9 Per-
haps this is another way of stating the ideal of free collective bargain-
ing. And as so stated, it should be perceived as one of the important
goals of national labor policy.
Inevitably, some tension exists, at least in the short run, between
freedom of contract and industrial peace. Freedom of contract in the
form of free collective bargaining may, from the perspective of history,
5 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §9(a), 61 Stat. 143
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958) [hereinafter cited as LMRA], provides: "Repre-
sentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining .... "
6LMRA § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(Supp. 111, 1962).
7Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 8(e), 73 Stat. 543 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. III, 1962) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
8 For example, the power of the National Labor Relations Board and the courts
to designate mandatory subjects of bargaining restricts freedom of contract. It can
force negotiation over issues that otherwise might be excluded from deliberation.
This in turn may have an impact upon the substantive terms of the contract See
Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909
(1956) (stock purchase plan); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (retirement and pension plan) ; NLRB v.
J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948) (merit
wage increase); cf. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958) (ballot clause).
The Supreme Court, however, has mitigated this intrusion upon freedom of
contract to some extent by holding that a party may bargain to an impasse for a
contract provision giving it unilateral control over a mandatory subject. NLRB v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). Compare Cox & Dunlop, Regulation
of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REv.
389 (1950), with Findling & Colby, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the
NLRB-Another View, 51 CoLum. L. Rxv. 170 (1951).
9 The National Labor Relations Act is designed to promote industrial peace
by encouraging the making of voluntary agreements governing relations
between unions and employers. The Act does not compel any agreement
whatsoever between employees and employers. Nor does the Act regulate
the substantive terms governing wages, hours and working conditions which
are incorporated in an agreement. The theory of the Act is that the making of
voluntary labor agreements is encouraged by protecting employees' rights to
organize for collective bargaining and by imposing on labor and management
the mutual obligation to bargain collectively.
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952). (Footnotes omitted.)
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be more productive of peaceful industrial relations than its alternatives, °
but when such collective bargaining---during either negotiation or ad-
ministration of the collective agreement-comes down to economic
struggle, as it sometimes does, industrial peace is sacrificed."
The courts often have been assigned the task of achieving an ac-
commodation between these sometimes incompatible policy goals,'" as
when these goals seem to conflict in the enforcement of the collective
bargaining agreement.3 It is, therefore, in terms of industrial peace
and freedom of contract that I should like to examine the emerging law
in this area as it has been elaborated in the recent decisions of courts,
and particularly of the Supreme Court of the United States.'4  But first,
what may seem to be a rather extensive detour is necessary. The ap-
parent detour leads into the law of the duty to bargain (a problem in
contract formation), and should afford a perspective for the considera-
tion of the problems of contract enforcement, which are the major con-
cern of this Article.
I. THE DUTY To BARGAIN AND THE TENSION BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL
PEACE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
If a union is able to organize a majority of employees in an appro-
priate unit, the National Labor Relations Act commands the employer
to "bargain collectively with the representative of his employees
... ,, 15 As Professor Russell Smith observed, "the Congress
which [in 1935] made the duty to bargain explicit for most employers
did not make a substantial contribution to its meaning. That task
was left to the new Labor Board and to the courts." 16
10 Faith in this proposition was one of the motivating forces that led to the
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act. And the faith is embodied in the
structure of the statute as subsequently amended. See LMRA § 1, 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
11 And sometimes the public reaction is sharp. See generally Wellington, Labor
Disputes: When Should the Government Intervene?, The New Republic, Jan. 11,
1960, p. 11.
12 See, e.g., International Union, UMW (Boone County Coal Corp.), 117 N.L.
R.B. 1095 (1957), enforcement denied, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958); United
Mine Workers (Westmoreland Coal Co.), 117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957), enforcement
denied, 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
'3 See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
14 See cases cited note 13 mspra.
'5 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
16 Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty To Bargain" Concept in American Law,
39 MicH. L. REv. 1065, 1089 (1941). See generally Cox, The Duty To Bargain in
Good Faith, 71 HAv. L. REv. 1401 (1958).
470 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW . [Vol.112:467
The Labor-Management Relations Act extended the duty to
unions, 7 and outlined its meaning. Section 8(d) provides that:
to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obli-
gation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession
18
But the principal task of elaboration was left for the Board and the
courts-an elaboration that demands inquiry into the purposes of a
statutory duty to bargain and the means by which those purposes are
to be enforced. Such an inquiry quickly exposes the tension between
the statute's pursuit of industrial peace and its insistence upon free-
dom of contract.
To begin with, there is what can best be described as the duty's
passive or supportive purpose. In the absence of a requirement of
good faith negotiation, collective bargaining may never occur. Either
the employer or, in some special situations, the union may unilaterally
impose the terms and conditions of employment. The statutory scheme
of protecting organization from unfair practices and of allowing em-
ployee choice between union and no-union in such a situation would
be frustrated.19 History, moreover, suggests that frustration leads to
industrial combat.2" The Senate Committee Report that accompanied
the NLRA stated the passive function of the duty to bargain in this way:
It seems clear that a guarantee of the right of employees to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing is a mere delusion if it is not accompanied by the
correlative duty on the part of the other party to recognize
17 LMRA § 8(b) (3), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1958).
18 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
19 The bill which became the Wagner Act included no provision specifically
imposing a duty on either party to bargain collectively. Senator Wagner
thought that the bill required bargaining in good faith without such a pro-
vision. However, the Senate Committee in charge of the bill concluded that
it was desirable to include a provision making it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to bargain collectively in order to assure that the Act
would achieve its primary objective of requiring an employer to recognize a
union selected by his employees as their representative. It was believed that
other rights guaranteed by the Act would not be meaningful if the employer
was not under obligation to confer with the union in an effort to arrive at
the terms of an agreement.
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 483 (1960). (Footnote omitted.)
20 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937).
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such representatives as have been designated . . . and to
negotiate with them in a bona fide effort to arrive at a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the procedure of
holding governmentally supervised elections to determine the
choice of representatives of employees becomes of little worth
if after the election its results are for all practical purposes
ignored. Experience has proved that neither obedience to the
law nor respect for law is encouraged by holding forth a right
unaccompanied by fulfillment. Such a course provokes con-
stant strife, not peace.21
A governmentally imposed duty to bargain, however, also may
have an active or independent purpose. If a union and an employer
are required to explain their respective positions, to listen to reasoned
argument, and to pursue the quest for agreement with sincerity, the
chance for agreement without warfare may be enhanced." This is
the faith that supports an active role for the duty to bargain. Its
ultimate goal, of course, is the maintenance of industrial peace. In
1902, the Industrial Commission, in a report to Congress, expressed
the faith in this way:
The chief advantage which comes from the practice of periodi-
cally determining the conditions of labor by collective bar-
gaining directly between employers and employees is, that
thereby each side obtains a better understanding of the actual
state of the industry, of the conditions which confront the
other side, and of the motives which influence it. Most strikes
and lockouts would not occur if each party understood ex-
actly the position of the other."
An inescapable question that the lawyer is likely to ask is how
either a passive or an active duty to bargain can be enforced. Pro-
fessor Smith insisted that "as a practical matter, a 'duty to bargain'
must, in order to be capable of enforcement, be given a special defini-
tion." He suggested two possibilities: "(1) that it be deemed simply
to require union recognition and negotiation; (2) that it be deemed to
require that plus the making of objectively reasonable proposals." 25
The pressure for governmental interference with freedom of con-
tract generated by the goal of industrial peace contained in a passive
duty to bargain is perhaps satisfied by Professor Smith's first defini-
21 S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935).
22 See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957), order set aside sub
nom. Insurance Agents' Union v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per
curiam), aff'd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).-
23H.R. Doc. No. 380, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 844 (1902).
24 Smith, supra -note 16, at 1108.
25 Ibid.
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tion, namely, "union recognition and negotiation." A passive duty to
bargain has as its purpose only the support of freely exercised employee
choice. Hopefully, free collective bargaining will then lead to indus-
trial peace; but the establishment of free collective bargaining, when the
employees desire it, is itself the central goal. As Senator Walsh re-
marked in 1935:
When the employees have chosen their organization,
when they have selected their representatives, all the bill pro-
poses to do is to escort them to the door of the employer and
say, "Here they are, the legal representatives of your em-
ployees." What happens behind those doors is not inquired
into, and this bill does not seek to inquire into it. 6
But Professor Smith's first definition will not satisfy the pressure
for governmental interference with freedom of contract generated by
the goal of industrial peace contained in an active duty to bargain. An
active duty to bargain demands that the Government march past Sena-
tor Walsh's door. Negotiation alone is not enough. The quest for
industrial peace demands that negotiation be conducted in a proper
fashion. The parties must explain their respective positions, listen to
reasoned arguments, and pursue the search for agreement with sin-
cerity and in genuine good faith. It may be quite difficult for the union
or employer that acts in a seemingly unreasonable manner to persuade
the National Labor Relations Board or a court that it has negotiated
in this proper fashion. The pressure on the parties, therefore, is
towards reasonable behavior; the tendency on the part of the NLRB
is to expect reasonable behavior." Thus, Professor Smith's second
definition for a duty to bargain requires, as a practical matter, "the
making of objectively reasonable proposals." To this definition should
be added the requirement of objectively reasonable bargaining pro-
cedures and practices. Of course it is the Government that decides,
through the NLRB and the courts, what are and what are not rea-
sonable proposals, procedures, and practices.
This has a twofold significance. First, it means a commitment,
in a quest for industrial peace, to a theory of human behavior that
may or may not be more valid than it is invalid. It may not be pos-
sible to assert with assurance that the pressure toward agreement with-
out warfare is enhanced by requiring employers and labor organiza-
tions to behave toward one another in a fashion deemed reasonable
26 79 Cong. Rec. 7660 (1935). Senator Walsh was the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor. His remarks were made during debate of the
bill that became the National Labor Relations Act.
27 See Dodd, Froin Maximum Wages to Minimumn Wages: Six Centuries of
Regulation of Employmext Contracts, 43 COLUm. L. Rav. 643, 675 (1943).
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by the Government.2 Second, it means an extensive sacrifice of free-
dom of contract. The enforcement of reasonable behavior results in
control over the substantive terms of the collective agreement.2" (Would
it, for example, be reasonable today for a union to resist including a
no-strike clause in a contract?) In the pursuit of industrial peace, this
sacrifice might be tolerable if there were reason to suppose that the
Government knows better than the parties what the substantive terms
of the collective bargaining agreement should be. But all relevant
experience suggests that this is not the case.3 And experience confirms
the received theory underlying the law's general commitment to free-
dom of contract. Professor Kessler's summation of this dogma is
splendid.
To keep pace with the constant widening of the market the
legal system has to place at the disposal of the members of the
community an ever increasing number of typical business
transactions and regulate their consequences. But the law
cannot possibly anticipate the content of an infinite number
of atypical transactions into which members of the commu-
nity may need to enter. Society, therefore, has to give the
parties freedom of contract . . . . [The application of the
rules of the common law of contract] . . . has to depend
on the intention of the parties or on their neglect to rule
otherwise . . . . Beyond that the law cannot go. It has
to delegate legislation to the contracting parties. As far as
they are concerned, the law of contract has to be of their own
making.
Thus freedom of contract does not commend itself for
moral reasons only; it is also an eminently practical principle.
It is the inevitable counterpart of a free enterprise system.3'
Further, even if Government were indeed wiser than the parties,
the cost of substituting governmental decision-making for private
decision-making should not be ignored by a society that depends, as
ours does, upon plural power centers to sustain its democrary3 The
ineluctable tendency of the times may be to shift power from private
groups to Government, but if democracy is to survive, this shift must
be resisted unless the expectation of gain is substantial. Such expecta-
28 A number of the problems that would be created by such a requirement are
explored in Cox, supra note 16, at 1435-42.
29 See Dodd, .mpra note 27, at 675.
30 See generally TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
(1948).
31 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 CoLum. L. REV. 629-30 (1943).
32 "Democracy in large measure rests on the fact that no one group is able to
secure such a basis of power and command over the total allegiance of a majority of
the population that it can effectively suppress or deny the claims of groups it opposes."
LiPsEr, TRow & COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 411 (1956).
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tion would not seem justified by the theory that supports an active
duty to bargain.
II. THE DUTY To BARGAIN AND THE SUPREMACY OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
I have described two functions of a duty to bargain-one
passive, the other active-in a way that makes them appear to be polar
extremes. The logic of each supports this description. However, day-
by-day adjudication may lead, day by day, to accommodation. And
so it has been with the duty to bargain. In fact, today there neither
exists a passive nor an active duty, but one containing elements of both.
Nevertheless, it seems fair to assert that in elaborating the duty to
bargain the courts have been nicely sensitive to and graciously solicitous
of freedom of contract. Indeed, the principal, but not the single, ex-
planation for a definition of a duty to bargain that goes beyond re-
quiring only "recognition and negotiation" is that such a definition
may fall short of achieving the passive function of the duty, namely,
support of free collective bargaining."8 The employer who does not
wish to bargain collectively could, under a definition requiring only
negotiation, bargain with what amounts to a fixed determination not
to reach agreement,84 with a determination to precipitate a strike or
other event that would destroy the weak union. For this reason, the
duty to bargain from the outset-first in case law and then by statute-
became a duty to bargain in good faith.
35
The requirement that the parties bargain in good faith could have
easily become a requirement that the parties make "objectively reason-
able proposals" and employ "objectively reasonable practices and pro-
cedures," since a good faith state of mind, or the lack of it, must be
inferred from the acts of the parties.?' And had reasonableness become
the test, the consequence would have been the same as that which flows
from an active duty to bargain-a substantial interference by Govern-
ment with freedom of contract. Moreover, since there is some evidence
of a tentative judicial commitment to an active duty to bargain," one
83 The purpose of a duty to bargain "is the making effective of the duty of manage-
ment to extend recognition to the union; the duty of management to bargain in good
faith is essentially a corollary of its duty to recognize the union. Decisions under
this provision reflect this." NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 484-85
(1960).
34 See, e.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
S5 See, e.g., NLRB v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1939) ; see text
accompanying note 18 supra.
86 See generally Smith, supra note 16.
37 See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Truitt holds that
when an employer pleads poverty in response to a union's request for a wage increase,
he must, upon demand, open his books to the union. The majority opinion uses the
language of good faith. But it is clear, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion
suggests, that good faith is not the issue. See Cox, supra note 16, at 1430-35.
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might well have thought that good faith and objectively reasonable
behavior were destined to merge and to lead to a sacrifice of freedom
of contract. That this has not happened in any substantial measure
is traceable to generally wise judicial review, and particularly to the
wisdom in decision and expression of the Supreme Court.
The expression has set a mood-a mood reflected perhaps in
these quotations:
The Act does not fix and does not authorize anyone to fix
generally applicable standards for working conditions."
The Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel
concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive
terms of collective bargaining agreements. 9
It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system
where the government does not attempt to control the results
of negotiations, cannot be equated with an academic collec-
tive search for truth-or even with what might be thought
to be the ideal of one. The parties-even granting the modi-
fication of views that may come from a realization of
economic interdependence-still proceed from contrary and
to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self
interest. The system has not reached the ideal of the
philosophic notion that perfect understanding among people
would lead to perfect agreement among them on values.4"
This mood supports what I believe to be the best approach to the
problem of the duty to bargain. The statute is violated, Judge
Magruder tells us, when one of the parties bargains in a fashion that
discloses "a desire not to reach an agreement . . . . " Of course,
if the Board is not to be blinded by empty talk and by the
mere surface motions of collective bargaining, it must take
some cognizance of the reasonableness of the positions taken
• . . in the course of bargaining negotiations . . . . Thus
if an employer can find nothing whatever to agree to in an
ordinary current-day contract submitted to him, or in some
of the union's related minor requests, and if the employer
makes not a single serious proposal meeting the union at
least part way, then certainly the Board must be able to
conclude that this is at least some evidence of bad faith
41
Judge Magruder's formulations are an approach reflecting a mood
and not a definition. That the reasonableness of proposals, practices,
3 8 Terminal R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943).
39 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
4ONLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960).
41NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 887 (1953).
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and procedures is not to be ignored by the NLRB is patent. But
the approach surely is gentle to freedom of contract. An employer or
a union can be very unreasonable without violating the statute. By
and large, only the party bargaining with a desire not to reach agree-
ment is guilty of an unfair practice.' From time to time concern with
freedom of contract allows even such a wrongdoer to escape without
sanction.Y
It has been in the area of the regulation of union bargaining
practices that the Supreme Court has been sharpest in protecting
freedom of contract. The contrast between the Court's performance
here and its performance in the contract enforcement cases makes it
appropriate, therefore, that this detour into the law of the duty to
bargain end with a short discussion of the Insurance Agents' case.
44
During otherwise good-faith contract negotiation between the
Prudential Insurance Company and the Insurance Agents' Inter-
national Union, the union had its members "participate in a 'Work
Without a Contract' program-which meant that they would engage
in certain planned, concerted on-the-job activities designed to harass
the company." '5 For example, union members refused "for a time to
solicit new business," 4" "to comply with the company's reporting pro-
cedures," " and to participate in a company business campaign. The
agents reported late for work, distributed leaflets, and appealed to
policyholders to support their cause. In short, union member-agents
engaged in a partial strike, the equivalent of a slowdown or inter-
mittent work stoppage in an industrial establishment." Prudential
complained that this constituted a refusal to bargain, and the NLRB
42See, e.g., Majure v. NLRB, 198 F,2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952).
43 See, e.g., NLRB v. Cummer-Graham Co., 279 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1960).
44 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
451d. at 480.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 The Board made much turn on this. "The Board freely (and we think cor-
rectly) conceded here that a 'total' strike called by the union would not have sub-
jected it to sanctions under § 8(b) (3) . . . ." Id. at 491.
The Board contends that the distinction between a total strike and the
conduct at bar is that a total strike is a concerted activity protected against
employer interference by §§ 7 and 8(a) (1) of the Act, while the activity at
bar is not a protected concerted activity. We may agree arguendo with the
Board that this Court's decision in . . .Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin
Board, 336 U.S. 245, establishes that the employee conduct here was not a
protected concerted activity. On this assumption the employer could have
discharged or taken other appropriate disciplinary action against the em-
ployees participating in these 'slow-down,' 'sit-in,' and arguably unprotected
disloyal tactics.
Id. at 492-94. (Footnotes omitted.) The Court, however, was not impressed with
this line of reasoning. It said: "But surely that a union activity is not protected
against disciplinary action does not mean that it constitutes a refusal to bargain in
good faith." Id. at 494.
[Vo1.112:467
1964] FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 477
sustained the company's position. In effect, the Board held that the
union's work without a contract program was a per se violation of
section 8(b) (3) of the act, supporting its holding with the assertion
that the union's program was not consistent with reasonable bargain-
ing practices or procedures. "[R] eliance upon harassing tactics dur-
ing the course of negotiations for the avowed purpose of compelling
the company to capitulate to its terms," the Board contended, "is the
antithesis of reasoned discussion . . . [required by the statute]." 41
Such tactics, the Board claimed are not "traditional" or "normal."
Indeed, they are subject to the public's moral condemnation. 50
The Supreme Court would have none of this.
[W]e think the Board's approach involves an intrusion into
the substantive aspects of the bargaining process ....
[I] f the Board could regulate the choice of economic weapons
that may be used as part of collective bargaining, it would be
in a position to exercise considerable influence upon the sub-
stantive terms on which the parties contract. As the parties'
own devices became more limited, the Government might
have to enter even more directly into the negotiation of col-
lective agreements. Our labor policy is not presently erected
on a foundation of government control of the results of
negotiations.r'
The Insurance Agents' case and this statement are perhaps the
high watermark for freedom of contract in modem labor-management
relations.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
AND THE TENSION BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL PEACE AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
I have argued that achieving balance between the policies of
industrial peace and freedom of contract is a central task in the
49 Id. at 482.
5o Id. at 495.
51 Id. at 490. The Supreme Court's decision in Insurance Agents' seems to have
put to rest a doctrine closely related to that of the Board's in the principal case-
namely, that an economic strike in violation of contract is a refusal to bargain in
good faith under § 8(b) (3) and § 8(d). International Union, UMW (Boone County
Coal Corp.), 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), enforcement denied, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); cf. United Mine Workers (Westmoreland Coal Co.), 117 N.L.R.B. 1072
(1957), enforcement denied, 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958). In Lumber Workers,
130 N.L.R.B. 235, 242 (1961), the Board said: "The Trial Examiner found that the
strike . . . was in violation of the no-strike clause in the contract . . . and there-
fore constituted a refusal to bargain. Assuming without deciding that the strike did
violate the no-strike clause, we find on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in the
Prudential Insurance case that such conduct did not also constitute a violation of Sec-
tion 8(b) (3) of the Act." (Footnote omitted.)
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elaboration of a statutory duty to bargain. The same is true for the
enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. But whereas
freedom of contract has-and, as I think, properly-dominated the
law of the duty to bargain, it has been the noble quest for industrial
peace that has captured the law of contract enforcement.
Serious federal enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement
dates from Lincoln Mills.52 That celebrated case held that Section 301
of the Labor-Management Relations Act ' empowers a district court
to order specific performance of the arbitration promise in a collective
agreement. The Court in its ipse dixit also announced that "the
substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which
the courts must fashion from the policies of our national labor laws." 54
These policies include the goals of industrial peace and freedom of
contract. Indeed, in Lincoln Mills, the Court's opinion placed sub-
stantial reliance upon the legislature's stated quest for industrial peace
through contract enforcement. Mr. Justice Douglas quoted the follow-
ing from the Senate Report:
"If unions can break agreements with relative impunity,
then such agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial rela-
tions. The execution of an agreement does not by itself pro-
mote industrial peace. The chief advantage which an
employer can reasonably expect from a collective labor agree-
ment is assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term
of the agreement. Without some effective method of assur-
ing freedom from economic warfare for the term of the
agreement, there is little reason why an employer would
desire to sign such a contract.
"Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements
and to promote industrial peace through faithful performance
by the parties, collective agreements . . . should be enforce-
able in the Federal courts." 65
Of course there is no suggestion in the legislative history of sec-
tion 301 that the pursuit of industrial peace should carry with it a
repudiation of the proposition-to quote from the opinion in the
Insurance Agents' case-that "our labor policy is not . . . erected on
52 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
5361 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958), which provides: "Suits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce . . .may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
54353 U.S. at 456. See generally Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose
and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957).
55 353 U.S. at 454.
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a foundation of government control of the results of negotiations." 8
The legislative history of section 301 on many issues is cloudy; 7
here it is nonexistent 8 Accordingly, to the extent that litigation under
the section exposes tension between the policies of industrial peace and
freedom of contract, the task of accommodation-even more than with
the duty to bargain-is a task for the courts alone.
Since Lincoln Mills, three types of litigation have been of prin-
cipal importance under the statute. One of these need not concern us.
There is no issue of industrial peace versus freedom of contract in the
cases dealing with the allocation of power among federal and state
courts ' and of jurisdiction between courts and the NLRB.6" But
such an issue may be at the bottom of the arbitration cases " and the
cases involving a strike during the term of a contract.
6 2
It is probably apparent why tension may be thought to exist
between the goal of industrial peace and that of freedom of contract in
litigation involving a strike during the term of an agreement. A rule
of construction that strongly favors the finding of a no-strike pledge,
may serve-or be thought to serve-as a deterrent to industrial war-
fare. Yet, if the rule of construction is unrelated to the sense of the
collective agreement, the rule substitutes governmental decision-making
for private decision-making, and is therefore an inescapable inter-
ference with freedom of contract.
It is less apparent, however, why tension may be thought to exist
between industrial peace and freedom of contract when a case involves
56 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
57 "The legislative history of § 301 is somewhat cloudy and confusing." 353 U.S.
at 452.
Zs The legislative history of § 301 is collected in an appendix to the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. 353 U.S. at 485-546.
-5 See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (state
courts must apply federal primary law in § 301 actions); Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
under § 301). See generally Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. Cu.
L. REv. 542, 556-61 (1959).
60 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). See generally Sovern,
Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1963).
61 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ;
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
62Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). Cf. Atkin-
son v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local
50, Am. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962). The Atkinson and Drake Bakeries
cases involve the question whether the arbitration or judicial forum is the proper
forum in which to sue over a strike allegedly in breach of contract. They do not
cast light on the freedom of contract-industrial peace question. Nor does Sinclair
Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), dealing with the injunctive remedy in
federal courts. The issues in the Sinclair case involve subtle questions of statutory
interpretation-of the relationship between Congress and the Court--questions that
push to one side the freedom of contract-industrial peace problem. See generally,
Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comnment
on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547 (1963).
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enforcement of the promise to arbitrate. In a suit to compel arbitration
the union usually is the plaintiff.' The underlying dispute that the
union wants sent to arbitration is a dispute over the meaning of the
agreement. For example, the employer may have classified certain jobs
and the union contends that this act is a breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. In the suit to compel arbitration, the union alleges
that the employer is also in breach of the contract for refusing to submit
the underlying dispute to an arbitrator; and the employer's answer is
that he never promised to arbitrate a dispute over job classification. 4
An examination of what is likely to happen should the court find that
the dispute over job classification is not subject to arbitration reveals
the tension between the conflicting policies. Unlike commercial arbi-
tration, the alternative to labor arbitration is not likely to be a judicial
testing of the underlying dispute. 5 Theoretically, the union in the
example could sue the employer under section 301, on the ground that
the employer's action was in breach of contract. Actually-and for
reasons that are not very clear to me--it would be surprising if such
a course were followed.6" The union is likely either to accept the
employer's action, or, if the issue is thought important enough, to
strike.6 7  Accordingly, since strike may be the alternative to arbitra-
tion, the goal of industrial peace invites the judiciary to fashion a rule
of construction that gives generous scope to the arbitration promise.
And, if that rule of construction departs from the sense of the collective
agreement, it will be a rule that results in "government control of the
results of negotiations." It will be a rule, in short, that sacrifices free-
dom of contract.
I should now like to examine the extent to which the Court in
fact has fashioned rules of construction that give generous scope to
the promise to arbitrate and the promise not to strike and then to
inquire into the wisdom of these rules in light of the policies of indus-
trial peace and freedom of contract.
63It is the union that generally complains about action taken by the employer.
Its complaint goes through the grievance procedure spelled out in the contract. At
any stage of this procedure the dispute may be settled. If it cannot be settled by
the parties, it then may go to arbitration. See CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING 96-119 (1951).
64 Cf. Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d
922 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
65 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
66 At one time it may have been that the unions were afraid of the courts. But
surely that is no longer true. Nor is it likely that unions often refrain from litigation
out of a concern for industrial harmony. The explanation may just be habit; and
the habit may not last for long.
67 Cf. Summers, Labor Law Decisions of Supreme Court: 1961 Term, in A.B.A.
SECTION ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1962 PROCEEDINGS 51.
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IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
AND THE SUPREMACY OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE
Lincoln Mills was itself an action for specific performance of the
promise to arbitrate. However, the opinions in the case did not
address themselves to the question of the role of the judge in deciding
whether to order arbitration.6" Most state courts had approached this
question as they might any question of contract interpretation; 69 and
after Lincoln Mills most federal courts followed suit.7" This approach
at best is neutral to arbitration. It imposes on the judge an obligation
to examine the promise to arbitrate in light of all admissible intrinsic
and extrinsic evidence brought before the court, and then to decide
whether the specific underlying dispute is within the ambit of the
arbitration clause.
The propriety of this approach came before the Supreme Court in
1960 in a series of cases-the arbitration trilogy-involving the United
Steelworkers of America.71 The opinion in Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co.72
is the Court's principal effort at reasoned elaboration, and accordingly,
deserves principal attention. The underlying dispute in that case was
over the contracting out of the bargaining unit of repair and mainte-
nance work. The union contended that this act violated the em-
ployer's no-lockout pledge, and requested arbitration of the dispute.
But the request was refused by the employer on the ground that the
contracting out of work was strictly a function of management, and
that the collective agreement in terms provided that, "matters which
are strictly a function of management shall not be subject to
arbitration." '
This argument, which was successful in the lower courts,74 failed
to persuade the Supreme Court. In ordering arbitration, the Court
said:
68 See generally Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1482 (1959).
69 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App.
Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). Cutler-
Hanner was explicitly rejected in United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960).
7 0 See, e.g., Local 201, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 262
F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1959) ; Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works,
257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958). See generally, Wellington,
Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1268, 1281-1300 (1959).
71 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ;
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
72 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
78Id. at 576.
74 The District Court granted respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint.
168 F. Supp. 702. It held after hearing evidence, much of which went tO the
merits of the grievance, that the agreement did not "confide in an arbitrator
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An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage.
7 5
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular
grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful
evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration
can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause
is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad. Since any
attempt by a court to infer such a purpose necessarily compre-
hends the merits, the court should view with suspicion an
attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the construction
of the substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even
through the back door of interpreting the arbitration clause,
when the alternative is to utilize the services of an arbitrator.76
Several reasons were advanced by the Court to support this rule of
construction. As a matter of ordinary contract law, the question of
whether the underlying dispute is subject to arbitration, and the merits
of that dispute, are usually intertwined. Thus, in Warrior, the dispute
over the contracting out of maintenance and repair work is not compre-
hended by the arbitration clause if, as the employer argued, contracting
out is "strictly a function of management." Whether contracting out
is "strictly a function of management," however, is also the central
issue on the merits. For, if it is "strictly a function of management,"
the employer in contracting out work exercised power delegated to
him under the agreement. He, therefore, broke no promise. Ac-
cordingly, the Court reasoned that since, as a matter of comparative
competence, the labor arbitrator has a substantial advantage over the
lay judge, every opportunity ought to be utilized to allow the better
the right to review the defendant's business judgment in contracting out
work." . . . It further held that "the contracting out of repair and main-
tenance work, as well as construction work, is strictly a function of manage-
ment not limited in any respect by the labor agreement involved here." . . .
The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote, 269 F.2d 633, the majority
holding that the collective agreement had withdrawn from the grievance
procedure "matters which are strictly a function of management" and that
contracting out fell in that exception.
Id. at 577. The majority opinion in the Supreme Court repeatedly confuses-as
perhaps the Court of Appeals did-the grievance procedure and arbitration. Arbi-
tration, of course, is the terminal step in the grievance procedure. A dispute that is
not within the ambit of the arbitration promise, however, may still be a dispute that
is subject to the other steps of the grievance procedure-steps that impose on the
parties an obligation to try and reach a negotiated settlement of their differences,
but do not impose upon them the obligation of submitting the dispute, if it cannot
be resolved, to binding determination by a third party.
75 363 U.S. at 582-83.
7 6 1d. at 584-85.
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qualified decision-maker to pass upon the central issue in the case.77
The rule of construction announced by the Court admirably accom-
plishes this end.
The second reason adduced by the Court to support its rule is the
statutory policy of industrial peace: "In the commercial case, arbitra-
tion is the substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute
for industrial strife." 7s Thus is arbitration linked to industrial peace.
And it is this link that supports much of the law of section 301.
Finally, the Court insists that its rule of construction is con-
sistent with the policy of freedom of contract. It is a rule which is
supposedly responsive to the intentions of the contracting parties. The
Court states that, "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party can-
not be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
agreed so to submit." "
But whatever the reasoning of the Court, the majority opinion
makes clear that in a suit to compel arbitration there is to be no
thoroughgoing judicial inquiry into whether the reluctant party in this
case promised to submit this dispute to arbitration. Moreover, in the
companion Enterprise case,"0 the Court makes it equally clear that the
reluctant party is not to have serious judicial consideration of this
question in a post-arbitration proceeding-one to enforce, or set aside,
the arbitrator's award. Said the Court: "The refusal of courts to
review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements." s1 But the issue
on the merits and the issue of whether the particular dispute is compre-
hended by the arbitration clause usually are bound together. In
Warrior, both issues turn on whether contracting out is "strictly a
function of management." To deny review to one question is to deny
review to both.
The Court is less than illuminating about the reason for the
Enterprise rule. It seems to assume that the Warrior rationale retains
its original persuasiveness in a post-arbitration case. 2 Surely, how-
ever, at least one of the stated reasons for Warrior has little application
77 See Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HARv. L. REv.
1268, 1281-1300 (1959).
78 363 U.S. at 578.
79 Id. at 582.
SoUnited Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
81 Id. at 596.
82 As we stated in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., . . . the arbitrators under these collective agreements are
indispensable agencies in a continuous collective bargaining process. They
sit to settle disputes at the plant level-disputes that require for their solution
knowledge of the custom and practices of a particular factory or of a particu-
lar industry as reflected in particular agreements.
Id. at 596. (Footnote omitted.)
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after an arbitrator has held his hearing and issued his award. It may
be true that the arbitrator is better qualified than the court to decide
whether contracting out is "strictly a function of management." But
after an arbitrator has made the determination, there is no reason why
his decision should not be subject to judicial review. The comparative
competence doctrine that supports Warrior ought to be considered in
much the same way as the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in adminis-
trative law. Thus, an arbitrator initially may be better able than a
court to inform himself about the content of the phrase "strictly a
function of management." He may have experience which makes it
easier for him to understand the relevance of past practices. He may
have a feel for the common law of the plant that the judge lacks. More-
over, he may be able to proceed in a more informal and leisurely
fashion than the judge in a prearbitration hearing.
But these considerations do not suggest that a court lacks com-
petence to review what the arbitrator has done in light of what the
arbitrator has said.' Indeed, it is quite improper, where contempt of
court and ultimate imprisonment are at stake, for a court to rubber-
stamp the decision of a private arbitrator when the reluctant party,
from the beginning, has insisted that he never agreed to allow the
arbitrator to decide the dispute."4
I have suggested that the Court has given generous scope to the
arbitration promise in collective bargaining agreements. No less
generosity has been lavished upon the no-strike promise. Indeed, the
promise itself has been manufactured seemingly by judicial magic.
Lucas Flour " is the case of principal importance. A collective
agreement provided for arbitration over "any difference as to the true
interpretation of this agreement," and also stated that, "during such
arbitration, there shall be no suspension of work." Another paragraph
of the arbitration article provided that, "should any difference arise
between the employer and the employee, same shall be submitted to
arbitration . . . . " Nothing was said in this latter paragraph about
work stoppages.86
83 The Court states, indeed, that: "When the arbitrator's words manifest an
infidelity to . . . [his obligation to make an award that 'draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement'], courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award." Id. at 597. But then, for reasons that are unclear, the Court asserts
that: "Arbitrators have no .obligation to the Court to give their reasons for an award.
To require opinions free of ambiguity may lead arbitrators to play it safe by writing
no supporting opinions. This would be undesirable for a well-reasoned opinion tends
to engender confidence in the integrity of the process and aids in clarifying the under-
lying agreement." Id. at 598. (Footnote omitted.)
84 See generally Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise To Arbitrate, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 471 (1962).
85 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.'95 (1962).'
so Id. at 96.
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A difference did arise between the employer and an employee.
The employer fired an employee under an article in the agreement that
reserved to management "the right to discharge" for unsatisfactory
work.87  In protest the union struck, but without success. The em-
ployer's action was upheld in subsequent arbitration, with both parties
agreeing that the dispute was within the ambit of the arbitration
article. The employer then sued the union in a state court for damages
resulting from the strike and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The state tribunals, applying local contract law, held that the
union had broken its contract by striking when it did.8 The state
courts' choice of law, the Supreme Court reasoned, was improper.
Lincoln Mills had held that the primary rights and duties of the
parties to a collective agreement were regulated by federal law when
suit was brought in a federal court under section 301. Of course,
primary rights and duties could not be governed by different laws
merely because of the accident of the choice of a forum.' So much
was obvious-inescapably so-but I should have thought no more. The
Court, however, disposed of the merits with that wonderful effortless-
ness that, in the labor field at least, has become its latter-day hallmark.
Of course the strike was in breach of contract, said the Court, for the
agreement "expressly imposed upon both parties the duty of submitting
the dispute in question to final and binding arbitration." " When such
is the case, a no-strike promise is implied.
Two reasons were advanced without elaboration in support of this
rule. One was freedom of contract: "To hold otherwise would ob-
viously do violence to accepted principles of traditional contract law." "
This assertion is without citation. The other reason, and explicitly the
more important one, was industrial peace: "Even more in point," said
87 Ibid.
88 [T]he employer . . . brought . . . suit against the union in the
Superior Court of King County, Washington, asking damages for business
losses caused by the strike. After a trial that court entered a judgment in
favor of the employer in the amount of $6,501.60. On appeal the judgment
was affirmed by Department One of the Supreme Court of Washington.
57 Wash. 2d 95, 356 P.2d 1. The reviewing court held that the pre-emption
doctrine of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
did not deprive it of jurisdiction over the controversy. The Court further
held that § 301 . . . could not "reasonably be interpreted as pre-empting
state jurisdiction, or as affecting it by limiting the substantive law to be
applied." 57 Wash. 2d, at 102, 356 P.2d, at 5. Expressly applying principles
of state law, the Court reasoned that the strike was a violation of the collec-
tive bargaining contract, because it was an attempt to coerce the employer
to forego his contractual right to discharge an employee for unsatisfactory
work.
369 U.S. at 97-98. (Footnotes omitted.)
89 For further elaboration see Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26
U. CHl. L. R-v. 542, 556-61 (1959).
90 369 U.S. at 105.
91 Ibid.
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the Court, "a contrary view would be completely at odds with the
basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral process
as a substitute for economic warfare." 92 This assertion is supported
by a citation to Warrior. Thus are the arbitration and strike cases
united by the quest for industrial peace and a purported respect for
freedom of contract.
It is now proper to ask whether freedom of contract has been
respected and whether it is likely that industrial peace has been
advanced by this legislative program of the Court.
Mr. Justice Black dissented in Lucas Flour. He argued that
the Court's holding marked a departure from the statutory policy of
freedom of contract.
I have been unable to find any accepted principle of
contract law-traditional or otherwise-that permits courts
to change completely the nature of a contract by adding new
promises that the parties themselves refused to make in order
that the new court-made contract might better fit into what-
ever social, economic, or legal policies the courts believe to be
so important that they should have been taken out of the realm
of voluntary contract by the legislative body and furthered
by compulsory legislation."3
Mr. Justice Black was clear that freedom of contract demanded a
conclusion contrary to the Court's. He said:
Both parties to collective bargaining discussions have much
at stake as to whether there will be a no-strike clause in any
resulting agreement. It is difficult to believe that the desire
of employers to get such a promise and the desire of the
union to avoid giving it are matters which are not constantly
in the minds of those who negotiate these contracts. In such
a setting, to hold-on the basis of no evidence whatever-
that a union, without knowing it, impliedly surrendered the
right to strike by virtue of "traditional contract law" or any-
thing else is to me just fiction. 4
Mr. Justice Black surely seems correct. The no-strike pledge is a
promise commonly found in collective bargaining agreements. 5 It
has never been thought to be an unimportant promise." Accordingly,
it is hardly probable that the parties overlooked it, or that they assumed
92 Ibid.
93 Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
95 One study suggests that ninety-four percent of collective agreements contain
explicit no-strike pledges. Some pledges are very broad, some very narrow in terms.
See 2 BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS SERv. § 77 (1960).
96 See Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope,
1949 WASH. U.L.Q. 3, 12.
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that its inclusion in any way would be redundant. Yet, the parties did
expressly agree to arbitrate the dispute. Might it not be said, there-
fore, that they must have meant that the dispute was not to be settled
by economic combat? Is it not fair to assume that the parties chose
arbitration as the exclusive remedy, and in so doing rejected alternative
remedies? " This argument assumes that the parties established a
dispute-settlement procedure that coincides with the Court's notion of
a reasonable procedure. It is an argument that might be thought to
make good sense if the events that took place in Lucas Flour were, at
the time of contract formation, remote or unforeseeable. As
Professor Fuller has observed, when courts, in finding implied terms
in contracts, talk of intention, they frequently are not talking about
"conscious and deliberate choice" but rather are discussing "the manner
in which current mores and conceptions of fairness can be said to
influence and shape the conduct of parties without their being aware
of the existence of alternatives." 's But Mr. Justice Black's unanswer-
able point is that in collective bargaining agreements the omission of
a no-strike clause must itself be taken to be a "conscious and deliberate
choice" of the parties.
It may seem unreasonable or unfair for a union to bargain hard
and successfully for an arbitration promise and not give up its right
to strike. It may also seem unreasonable for an employer to bargain
hard and successfully for unilateral control over many of the terms and
conditions of employment and for a rio-strike pledge without giving in
exchange a promise to arbitrate.9 But here, as with the duty to
bargain, the enforcement of reasonable behavior can only be at a
sacrifice. And what is sacrificed here, even as what would be sacrificed
there, is freedom of contract.'
What has been said about Lucas Flour can, I think, also ultimately
be said about the arbitration cases. But the Court's intrusion upon
the principles of freedom of contract in the arbitration cases is less
clear cut because the problem itself is a more complicated one.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Warrior, most courts,
when requested to order specific performance of the promise to arbi-
trate, inquired fully into whether the arbitration promise comprehended
97 Cf. Summers, Labor Law Decisions of Supreme Court: 1961 Termn, in A.B.A.
SECrION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAWv, 1962 PROCEEDINGS 51, 57.
98 FuLLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 764 (1947).
99 It is clear that this would not violate the employer's duty to bargain. Cf.
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). "Our labor policy is not
presently erected on a foundation of government control of the results of negotiations."
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960). See text accompanying
note 50 supra.
1 o0 See text accomnpanying notes 28-32 supra.
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the particular underlying dispute.'' No presumptions were indulged.
Close attention to these decisions, however, suggests that the courts
were not very successful.' In the opinion of a number of disinter-
ested observers, the courts often failed to compel arbitration where a
more sophisticated study of the underlying problem would have in-
dicated that arbitration was appropriate.3 Perhaps this is attributable
to the nature of the collective bargaining agreement and the institutional
difficulties that such a document is likely to pose for a court. In
Warrior, the majority quoted the following from Professor Cox in
making a similar point:
"[I]t is not unqualifiedly true that a collective-bargain-
ing agreement is simply a document by which the union and
employees have imposed upon management limited, express
restrictions of its otherwise absolute right to manage the enter-
prise, so that an employee's claim must fail unless he can point
to a specific contract provision upon which the claim is founded.
There are too many people, too many problems, too many
unforeseeable contingencies to make the words of the contract
the exclusive source of rights and duties. One cannot reduce
all the rules governing a community like an industrial plant to
fifteen or even fifty pages. Within the sphere of collective
bargaining, the institutional characteristics and the govern-
mental nature of the collective-bargaining process demand a
common law of the shop which implements and furnishes the
context of the agreement. We must assume that intelligent
negotiators acknowledged so plain a need unless they stated
a contrary rule in plain words." '04
Of course there are limits to this concept of a collective bargaining
agreement, and it may be that the overwhelming presumption in favor
of arbitration announced in Warrior goes too far.' But on the whole,
I should think that Warrior serves the parties by effectuating their
purpose at least as well, and probably better, than the old approach.
And it must be admitted that a middle way is not easy to devise. 6
1I See cases cited notes 69-70 supra.
'
0 2 See Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HAgv. L. REv.
1268, 1281-1300 (1959).
103 See, e.g., Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through
the Looking Glass, 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1 (1952); Cox, Current Problems in the Law
of Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 247 (1958).
1o 363 U.S. at 579-80, quoting Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72
HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1498-99 (1959).
105 See Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law October Term, 1959, 60
CoLum. L. REv. 901, 919-35 (1960).
106Judge Magruder, a sensitive and creative judge, well grounded in labor-
management relations, tried to devise such a middle way in a series of opinions
written after Lincoln Mills and before Warrior. See, e.g., Local 201, Intl Union of
Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 262 F.2d 265 (lst Cir. 1959); New Bedford
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But whatever the conclusion may be as to Warrior's impact upon
freedom of contract when the rule of that case is contemplated in
isolation, it seems clear that great freedom has been eroded by the
joinder of Enterprise with Warrior. The consequence of these cases,
which compel arbitration and enforce the arbitrator's award without
any serious judicial inquiry into whether the arbitration promise in
fact reaches the underlying dispute, is to vest the arbitrator with a
power that is limited only by the arbitrator's own understanding of his
institutional responsibility. The arbitrator may see himself as, in
effect, a private judge. The contract may be centrally important to
him. He may, however, be more interested in maintaining production,
bettering morale, or fostering industrial stability than he is in the
language of the collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, the Court's
opinion in Warrior invites just this. Mr. Justice Douglas said:
The parties expect that . . . [the arbitrator's] judgment of
a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract
says but, insofar as the collective-bargaining agreement per-
mits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a par-
ticular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop,
his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or
diminished.' °
When the arbitrator concerns himself with these matters he may
neglect to consider whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the par-
ticular dispute.'
The arbitration cases, in unleashing the arbitrator by diminishing
the role of the courts, may upset the reasonable expectations of parties
who with words tried to order the future in that fashion which they
deemed, at the time of contract formation, to be best for them. Deci-
Defense Prods. Div. v. Local 1113, UAW, 258 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1958); Boston
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents' Union, 258 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1958) ; Local
149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958). He was not completely successful. See
Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HAuv. L. REv. 1268, 1281-
1300 (1959).
107 363 U.S. at 582.
108 Arbitrators, who, some believe, are already all too prone to become indus-
trial statesmen, will be further encouraged to decide cases, as the Court sug-
gests, on the basis, not of the evidence and the agreement, but in accordance
with their views of what will be most likely to increase production, heighten
morale, and decrease tensions. It seems hardly necessary to point out that
if, as the Court holds, an arbitrator has the power to decide a question to
which both the agreement and the evidence establish that there is only one
answer, he has the power to give the other answer. When the contract
provides that the employer shall have the right to contract out, the arbitrator
may decide that it will heighten morale or decrease tensions to prohibit con-
tracting out. Of course it is equally true that when the contract provides
for no contracting out, he might decide that it would increase production to
permit the employer to contract out.
Hays, supra note 105, at 925-26.
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sions that accomplish this result undercut freedom of contract. Some
other important public policy must be served, therefore, if such deci-
sions are to command support. 0 9
I have argued that in dealing with the arbitration promise and the
no-strike pledge of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court has
fashioned rules which undercut the important labor policy of freedom
of contract. I have suggested, however, that the Court has attempted
to justify the rules it has fashioned by insisting that they advance the
important quest for industrial peace. The Court's attempt to justify its
performance invites speculation along two lines.
How important is the problem of industrial warfare during the
life of a contract? And to what extent are the Court's rules likely to
promote peace in industrial relations?
There is little reason to think that strikes, triggered either by the
refusal of an employer to arbitrate an arbitrable grievance or by an
employer's unilateral action that admittedly is subject to arbitration,
are an important source of industrial unrest. Only a small number
of arbitration proceedings require judicial intervention, and this was
true before the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions."' This fact
certainly is not surprising, since most parties are likely to comply with
their agreement, and sanctions exist apart from law."' The rela-
tionship betwen the union and the employer is a continuing one, the
harmony of which might be jeopardized by the failure of one party to
stick to its promise. Moreover, if the employer declines to arbitrate,
he invites the sanction of self-help in the form of a work stoppage.
These deterrents mean that work stoppages are usually not necessary." 2
Nor is a union likely to strike-whether or not it has promised to
refrain from so doing--over a dispute that an employer is willing to
arbitrate. A strike is serious and costly. It is too much the ultimate
weapon to receive other than the most infrequent use as a means of
settling arbitrable grievances." 3 There is some irony, therefore, in
the relentless concern of the Court with industrial peace in the contract
enforcement cases and its only mild concern with that goal in the duty
to bargain (contract formation) cases. The industrial warfare that
109 See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
110Judicial procedures are rarely invoked either to compel arbitration or to
confirm or vacate awards. American Arbitration Association, Procedural and Sub-
stantive Aspects of Labor-Management Arbitration, 12 AIB. J. (n.s.) 67, 77 (1957).
ll The extent to which these propositions are true generally in our society is
suggested in a recent study by Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 Am. SOCIOLOGIcAL REv. 55 (1963).
112 See generally Shuman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68
-ARv. L. REv. 999 (1955).
113 Cf. BF.L & WICKERSHAm, THE PRAcTIcE or CoLLEcTiva BARGAINING 333
(1963).
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from time to time accompanies the negotiation of collective agreements
increasingly is being perceived as a national economic and political
problem." 4 But it is at the point of contract formation that the prob-
lem exists, not in the performance and enforcement of the collective
agreement." 5
Even if it were otherwise, however, the engaging question
would remain whether the Court's generous construction of arbitration
and no-strike clauses is likely to be productive of industrial peace.
This question should be refined before an answer is attempted. Al-
though there is some doubt,"" one may assume that neutral judicial
enforcement of the promise to arbitrate and the promise not to strike
would further the law's quest for industrial peace by deterring breach
of contract." 7 No more is meant by neutral judicial enforcement than
enforcement through rules of interpretation that are designed with the
single purpose of effectuating the sense of the collective agreement-
rules that reflect a sympathetic concern for the goal of freedom of
contract. With this concession made to judicial enforcement, the
question becomes whether the compulsory or noncontractual aspects of
the Court's rules further industrial peace. Put another way, is com-
pulsory arbitration of grievances and a compulsory ban on strikes over
arbitrable grievances likely to be productive of industrial peace? I
venture to answer that they are not. Consider the Lucas Flour rule
which by fiat prohibits strikes over arbitrable grievances. Unions are
not likely to strike over such grievances; when they do, feelings must
be running very high indeed. And when feelings run high is it likely
that the consequences will be altered by the legal rule? Mr. Paul
Jacobs' observations are suggestive:
Quite apart from the important policy questions that a pro-
hibition against strikes raises for a free society . . . another
consideration must be taken into account: it is impossible to
carry out such a policy in America.
Union members can always find other ways than the
formal, legal strike for achieving their purposes even over the
opposition of their leaders. If they are sufficiently ingenious,
they can always slow down operations legally, and if this is
done by enough employees it will have the same effect as an
actual strike" 8
114 See Williams, Settlement of Labor Disputes in Industries Affected With a
National Interest, 49 A.B.A.J. 862 (1963).
115 See Wellington, The Future of Collective Bargaining, The New Republic,
May 21, 1962, p. 12.
1lO Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
117 See generally Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MIcH. L.
REv. 635 (1959).
18 JACOBS, OLD BFxoRE ITS T=: COLLECTIvE BARGAINING AT 28, at 15 (1963).
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Consider the rule in Warrior and Enterprise that forces an em-
ployer to arbitrate a dispute he has not agreed to arbitrate. The union
would not have struck over the dispute unless it considered that dispute
very serious indeed. Now, if the employer is ultimately successful in
the arbitration, is there reason to suppose that the union will be con-
tained if it would not have been contained in the absence of the
arbitration? Perhaps, but here too Mr. Jacobs' words are suggestive.
Moreover, arbitration may accomplish no more than to postpone
economic combat to the time of contract renegotiation. This surely is
a likely consequence if the ultimate result of the compulsory arbitration
is a decision against the employer and the issue is one about which he
feels strongly." 9
The point, at least in part, is that it is misleading to think of a
collective bargaining agreement as an ordinary contract for a fixed
term. Many commercial contracts are just that; and after the term is
over, the association is ended. A collective bargaining agreement,
however, is one episode in a continuing, joint history of a firm and
union. It is a temporary calm in a restless, shifting relationship.
Accordingly, to attempt to compel the employer or the union during
contract time to yield on a deeply felt issue about which it never
consented to yield is not to resolve that issue. Rather-if it has any
consequence at all-, it is to delay ultimate resolution to a time when
the parties are freed from governmental constraint. 20  At that time-
the time of contract formation-economic combat may be the means
of decision. For at that time, the law's interest is not primarily with
economic peace, but with freedom of contract. 2'
I have suggested that the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
contract enforcement area have sacrificed freedom of contract in an
illusory quest for industrial peace. It may be asserted, however, on
the basis of what I have said, that while the goal of industrial peace
has not been served by the Court's rules, no serious long-run inter-
ference has been worked with freedom of contract. After all, the rules
developed by the Court are rules of construction which can be avoided
by explicit language in the collective agreement.' 22 A closely limited
119 See Shulman, supra note 112.
120 See Hays, .spra note 105, at 925.
121 See text accompanying notes 33-51 supra.
122 The rhetoric of the opinions at least suggests that the parties have the power
to overcome the rules of construction imposed upon them by the Court. It may be,
however, that the Court's quest for industrial peace will make it very difficult for the
parties-even assuming a harmony of desire-to overcome the Court's rules. Rules
may sound permissive but be obligatory. Cf. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUm. L. REv. 629 (1943).
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arbitration provision can be written.13 A no-no-strike clause may
present some grammatical difficulties, but it is not beyond the compe-
tence of the draftsman.
Professor Hays spoke to this issue in relation to the arbitration
cases and his words are relevant to Lucas Flour as well.
The vast majority of collective agreements now in effect con-
tain arbitration clauses that do not expressly exclude from
arbitration all matters which the parties did not consider
arbitrable. These clauses will, of course, be subject to the
interpretation that the Court has formulated. When the time
comes for renegotiating the existing collective agreements,
the attempt to transfer material to the arbitration clause, and
to broaden the exceptions that are to be included in that
clause, will meet with difficulty and resistance. Strikes over
arbitration clauses have become fairly common recently. The
Court's position is certain to add to their number. In other
words, as with so many efforts of well-meaning law makers,
the Court, in its attempt to enhance the stability of labor rela-
tions, may have succeeded in unstabilizing them to a con-
siderable extent, at least temporarily. 24
Professor Hays has properly stressed the short-run intrusion upon
freedom of contract. But it is also true that the balance of bargaining
advantage is shifted permanently when the law erects presumptions of
the sort found in the arbitration and no-strike cases. 5 For example,
it is, I should think, usually much easier for a union successfully to
resist the inclusion of a no-strike clause in a collective agreement than
12 General Electric is the company that probably has invested more time and
effort than any other on this. It is reported that the new contract between G.E. and
International Union of Electrical Workers,
will permit arbitration of both disciplinary issues and questions of contract
interpretation. But it specifies certain underlying principles for arbitrators
and courts to follow.
The main principle sought to be established by GE is that "the company
retains all its historic rights to manage the business subject only to the
express limitations set forth in this agreement."
Grievances are to be considered arbitrable only if they allege a violation
of a specific provision and the violation has a "direct relationship to the
primary, well-understood purpose of the contractual provision in question
rather than an indirect or implied relationship."
When the parties go to court in a dispute over arbitrability, GE wants it
understood that "the court will not indulge in any presumption that a demand
to arbitrate is arbitrable." Arbitration should not be ordered unless the court
finds "that the parties clearly intended that the question or questions involved
in the demand would be arbitrable."
1 LAB. R. REP. (54 L.PR.M.) 97-98 (Sept. 30, 1963).
124 Hays, vupra note 105, at 925.
125 Of course it is only in the short run-that is, with respect to existing contracts
-that the Coures decisions upset reasonable expectations. But in the long run-
that is, prospectively-they will have the effect, in many situations, of influencing
the substantive terms of the agreement. The consequences of the decisions in this
regard are similar to, but not nearly as effective as, a mandatory rule of law which,
e.g., writes a no-strike clause into every collective agreement.
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it is for the union to obtain a clause permitting a strike over an
arbitrable grievance. And in the negotiation of the agreement it may
be difficult indeed for the employer successfully to insist on a detailed
and explicit catalogue of exceptions to arbitration.
The Supreme Court decisions plainly have shifted the burden of
obtaining contract language that orders the future from union to
employer in the arbitration area and from employer to union in the
strike area. This insures that "the new court-made contract" will, in
the words of Mr. justice Black, "better fit into whatever social,
economic, or legal policies the courts believe to be so important that
they should have been taken out of the realm of voluntary contract by
the legislative body and furthered by compulsory legislation." 126
In its contract enforcement decisions, then, the Court has done
exactly what it said, in the good faith cases, should not be done. It
has erected a labor policy "on a foundation of government control of
the results of negotiations." 12
V. CONCLUSION
The analysis I have attempted hopefully suggests more than that
the contract enforcement cases were badly reasoned or wrongly decided;
more than that these cases are inconsistent in approach with the cases
in the duty-to-bargain area. The analysis also suggests something
about the strength and weaknesses of courts as institutions for
formulating and effectuating public policy.
The freedom of contract dogma, championed here in its applica-
tion to the collective bargaining agreement, often has been rejected in
other areas of contract law.18 The rejection often has been in the
name of public policy; and often it has been a wise rejection indeed.' 9
Examples can be found in the area of contract formation as well as in
that of contract performance. 180  The movement surely is quickening;
and the scholarly comment upon it has kept pace.' 8'
126 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 108 (1962) (dissenting
opinion).
127 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
128 E.g., insurance. See generally Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Con-
tract, 1954 INs. L.J. 151, 153.
129 For case and textual material about the problems of freedom of contract, see
SHEPuRmD & SHEa, LAw IN SocmITY-AN INTRODUcTiON TO FEOEm OF CONTRACr
(1960).
130 See, e.g., Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920) (stipulated
damage clause in a carefully drafted document struck down as penalty where there
was no obvious imbalance of bargaining power); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,
222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917) (good faith read into a carefully drafted document
-where there was no obvious imbalance of bargaining power-to satisfy consideration
requirement).
131 See, e.g., FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocIY 90-125 (1950) ; HAVING-
HuRsT, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT ch. 3 (1961); PARRY, THE SANCTITY OF
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One might think, for example, of the challenge to freedom of
contract offered by the standardized contract-that is, an agreement
which, "once its contents have been formulated by a business firm, is
used in every bargain dealing with the same product or service." 
1 32
Professor Kessler suggests that:
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with
strong bargaining power. The weaker party, in need of the
goods or services is frequently not in a position to shop
around for better terms, either because the author of the
standard contract has a monopoly . . . or because all com-
petitors use the same clauses. His contractual intention is
but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by
the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often
understood only in a vague way if at all."a
And Professor Llewellyn points to the difficulty with judicial response
to the problems posed by such contracts, while, at the same time, calling
for judicial action:
[T]he examination of the standardized contract of a particu-
lar modern line of trade to distinguish clauses serving the
better functioning of the work from those inspired by the
sole interest of the higher contracting party . . . is not a
task for which a common-law judge's equipment has pecu-
liarly fitted him.. . . Nor do I think it will ever so fit him
fully. But what it does fit him for is to see that there is such
a distinction; to see that free contract presupposes free bar-
gaining; and that where bargaining is absent in fact, the
conditions and clauses to be read into a bargain are not those
which happen to be printed on the unread paper, but are those
which a sane man might reasonably expect to find on that
paper.
1 34
CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH LAW ch. 3-4 (1959); Grunfeld, Reform in the Law of
Contract, 24 MODERN L. Ray. 63 (1961) ; Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Con-
tract, 1954 INs. L.J. 151; Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in
Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REv. 401
(1964) ; Schultz, The Special Nature of the Insurance Contract: A Few Suggestions
for Further Study, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 376 (1950); Sales, Standard Form
Contracts, 16 MODERN L. REv. 318 (1953). A few modem classics are: Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion, Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L.
REv. 629 (1943); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HIv. L. REv. 700 (1939); Llewellyn,
On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699 (1936), 37 CoLUM. L.
Rav. 341 (1937); Llewellyn, "What Price Contract-An Essay in Perspective," 40
YAE L.J. 704 (1931); Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454 (1909); Wil-
liston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CoRNEL L.Q. 365 (1921).
132Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts on Freedom of Contract,
43 CoLum. L. Ray. 629, 631 (1943).
1'3 Id. at 632.
134 Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HA{v. L. Rav. 700, 704 (1939).
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This is true, but one should observe the limits of the positions
stated. Judge Clark, in a well-known case 35 involving an automobile
dealership contract, is suggestive. The Ford Motor Company had
terminated a dealership in accordance with the language of an agree-
ment but allegedly without provocation. The contract between the
dealer and the company was standard. It had been drafted by Ford's
lawyers, and it was one-sided. The termination section provided that
the "agreement may be terminated 'at any time at the will of either
party by written notice . . .". 136 In response to the dealer's con-
tention that the contract should be read to permit termination only in
good faith, Judge Clark had this to say:
With a power of termination at will here so unmistak-
ably expressed, we certainly cannot assert that a limitation of
good faith was anything the parties had in mind. Such a
limitation can be read into the agreement only as an over-
riding requirement of public policy. This seems an extreme
step for judges to take. The onerous nature of the contract
for the successful dealer and the hardship which cancellation
may bring him have caused some writers to advocate it,
however; and an occasional case has seized upon elements of
overreaching to come to such a result on particular facts ...
But generally speaking, the situation arises from the strong
bargaining position which economic factors give the great
automobile manufacturing companies: the dealers are not
misled or imposed upon, but accept as nonetheless ad-
vantageous an agreement in form bilateral, in fact one-sided.
To attempt to redress this balance by judicial action without
legislative authority appears to us a doubtful policy. We
have not proper facilities to weigh economic factors, nor
have we before us a showing of the supposed needs which
may lead the manufacturers to require these seemingly harshbargains. 1.7
Several factors persuaded Judge Clark not to convert the contract
of the parties into a "new court-made contract." The dealer knew
what he was getting into; it would have been factitious for the court
to use the techniques of interpretation or construction in order to
fashion a seemingly less harsh bargain; 138 it was simply not clear
that, as a matter of comparative competence, the court could make
135 Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1940). On problems of automobile dealership contracts generally, see Kessler, Auto-
mobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957).
136 Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 135, at 676.
137 Id. at 677.
138 On some of the evils of using "interpretation" to reach results that are un-
related to the sense of the bargain see Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thotghts
on Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUm. L. REv. 629, 631 (1943).
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(and, in the case of good faith, administer) an agreement that would
serve society better than the parties had. It is one thing for a court
to rewrite a contract when one of the parties does not know what he
is agreeing to; it is something else when there is full understanding on
both sides. In the first situation, the court's vision is fixed on the
parties before it, one of whom needs protection.3 9 In the second situa-
tion, there is little reason to suppose that the parties need protection,
unless of course contracting was a near-necessity for the weaker party
and there was no reasonable alternative open to him.140 Accordingly,
for a court actively to intrude itself in this second situation suggests
that its vision is fixed on some supposed societal interest that tran-
scends the interest of the contracting parties. Here it is that courts
must proceed, if at all, with extreme caution. For there is the danger
of introducing into the law unnecessary instability by departing from
the reasoned elaboration of prior decisions and substituting, as the
rule of decision, the judge's notion of the good society." As Judge
Clark suggests, there often is little reason to be sanguine about that
notion. It may be said that courts "have not proper facilities to weigh
economic factors, nor have [they] before [them] a showing of the
supposed needs which may lead . . . to . . . seemingly harsh
bargains." 142
Consider now the collective bargaining agreement. The parties
knew what they were agreeing to. It was factitious for the Court to
use techniques of interpretation to reshape the agreement. It should
be clear that the parties are more competent than the Court; and that
the Court engaged in an unwise discretionary choice when it erected
the rules it did in the arbitration and strike cases. Moreover, unlike
the automobile dealership case, there is no felt inequality of bargaining
power between union and employer."' It is the existence of such in-
equality that often explains judicial interference with freedom of
139 See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts on Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 I-ADv. L. REv.
700 (1939).
140 See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873) (limita-
tion of liability, imposed by carrier on shipper, struck down as unreasonable).
141 Cf. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process-Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law 386-400 (tent. ed. 1958). "Would it be possible for people to
anticipate decisions of the type supposed at the time of primary activity [negotiation
and administration of contract], or at the time when a dispute first arose? If not,
what would be the effect of such decisions on the process of private ordering [nego-
tiation and administration of contract] ? On the process of private settlement, and
on the volume of litigation?" Id. at 398.
142 116 F2d at 677.
143 Indeed, as Professor Cox has said: "The most important purpose of the
Wagner Act was to create aggregations of economic power on the side of employees
countervailing the existing power of corporations to establish labor standards." Cox,
The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 H-Iv. L. Rxv. 1401, 1407 (1958).
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contract.14 Judge Clark, in his case, resisted the pressure generated
by a notorious imbalance of economic power for reasons that he took
to be more weighty. Those reasons are germane to the labor cases.
The countervailing pressure of a bargaining imbalance is absent.
Therefore it may truly be said that the Court's noble and well-
intentioned quest for industrial peace in the enforcement cases has
launched it on a legislative program which is institutionally unsound
and substantively unwise.
144 See generally Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 141, at 232-63.
